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| Abstract: In the first decades of the 20th century, Brazil formed an ‘unwritten alliance’ with 
the United States. This changed when Brazilian governments began to focus on the country’s 
national development and Washington did not give anything back for Brazil’s loyalty. In 
1961, Jânio Quadros launched the concept of Política Externa Independente, which really 
came into its own during the military regime, especially during Geisel’s government (1974-
1979). In the middle of the Cold War, Brazil developed many new bilateral and multilateral 
relationships, including with communist countries. Some of his predecessors had been more 
aligned with Washington, and are considered entreguistas, while those developing an inde-
pendent policy are called nacionalistas. This pendulum movement does also happen in times 
of democratic regimes. Cardoso was much more aligned to Washington, especially during his 
first mandate, while Lula really put Brazil on the world map. 
 Keywords: Foreign policy; Política Externa Independente; Nacionalistas; Entreguistas; Brazil.
| Resumo: Nas primeiras décadas do século 20, o Brasil formou uma “aliança não escrita” com 
os Estados Unidos. Isso mudou quando os governos brasileiros começaram a se concentrar no 
desenvolvimento nacional do país e Washington não deu nenhum apoio em troca da lealdade 
do Brasil. Em 1961, Jânio Quadros lançou o conceito de Política Externa Independente, 
que realmente se desenvolveu durante o regime militar, especialmente durante o governo de 
Geisel (1974-1979). No meio da Guerra Fria, o Brasil estabeleceu muitas novas relações bi-
laterais e multilaterais, inclusive com países comunistas. Alguns de seus antecessores tinham 
sido mais alinhados com Washington, e são considerados entreguistas, enquanto aqueles 
que desenvolveram uma política independente são chamados nacionalistas. Este movimento 
pendular também aconteceu em tempos de regimes democráticos. Cardoso foi muito mais 
alinhado com Washington, especialmente durante seu primeiro mandato, enquanto Lula 
realmente colocou o Brasil no mapa do mundo.
 Palavras-Chaves: Política Externa Independente; Nacionalistas; Entreguistas; Brasil.
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28 INTRODUCTION
In the first decades of the 20th century, Brazil formed an ‘unwritten alliance’ with the 
United States, according to Bradford Burns. However, in the country’s period of na-
tional development (1930-1989), Brazilian policies became more global and much less 
restricted to Washington. In 1961 the President of Brazil, Jânio Quadros, established 
the Política Externa Independente (PEI, Independent foreign policy], which meant not 
towing automatically the American line and really thriving to pursue foreign policies 
to further the country’s national development. But, this independent policy only re-
ally came to fruition during the military regime (1964-1985), in particular during 
the Geisel Government (1974-1979). Geisel really put Brazil on the world map and 
started numerous alliances, including with communist governments. But it is after the 
return and consolidation of democracy, especially in the 21st century, that Brazilian 
foreign policy initiatives have multiplied. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known 
as Lula (2003-2010), in particular, has been extremely active in developing a number 
of regional, intercontinental, mostly south-south, and even global initiatives.
This paper will study to what extent Brazilian foreign policy has really become 
independent, capable of developing more autonomy, and how its policies and coopera-
tion with the United States has evolved over these decades. Is there a pendulum move-
ment between governments establishing independent policies, considered nacionalistas 
and those more aligned to Washington, known as entreguistas? To what extent does this 
change in policies depend on the national governments or on external factors? After 
setting the historical context, the focus will be on foreign policies during the military 
regime, especially Geisel’s government, and during the democratic governments, in 
particular that of Lula. 
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL THE MILITARY REGIME 
In the nineteenth century Brazilian foreign policy was very dependent on the United 
Kingdom, as was the case of many (Latin American) countries. That country played 
a foremost role in the financial, economic areas, as well as in the sector of infra-
structure and utilities, although the Brazilian government kept the control over the 
railways it considered of crucial importance. British, German and American compa-
nies were also of paramount importance for the export and valorisation programmes 
of coffee, for a long time Brazil’s main export product. Britain started to lose its 
privileged position in the twentieth century when the United States becomes Brazil’s 
most important economic partner (Miller 1993: 133-137, 160-162, 166-167; Dean 
1989: 244-256; Topik 1998: 50-60). Brazilian foreign policy became aligned with 
Washington. That really started under the Barão de Rio Branco, who was minister 
of foreign affairs from 1902 until 1912, and is considered the founding father of 
Brazilian foreign policy. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1889, he had 
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29already started settling some territorial disputes, expanding Brazil’s territory at the 
same time, which he continued during his ministry, as well as establishing treaties 
with the remaining countries, so as to secure the frontiers with its ten neighbours 
(Drouleurs 2001: 124-145). Since then, Brazil lives in peace with all its neighbours, 
which is exceptional for a country of this size and with so many neighbours. It is 
sufficient to look at the situation of Russia, China and India, the last one much 
smaller. Other countries of comparable size have just one neighbour, Canada, or 
two, the United States. Coexisting peacefully with its neighbours has always been a 
cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy (Lafer 2007: 43-49).
With over 8,5 million km2, Brazil ranks fifth in the world and size is considered 
an important element in the positioning of Brazil in a global context. For Brazilian 
intellectuals, diplomats and politicians, size is not only a reference to the continental 
dimensions of the country but also to its population, over nearly 205 million in 2015, 
also fifth in world ranking, and to its “industrial structures and significant internal 
markets” (Guimarães 1999: 21,102). Darc Costa underlines one more crucial element: 
next to its continentalidade its maritimidade (2003: 79). Brazil has over 7500 km coast 
and a number of archipelagos in the Atlantic Ocean. The Ocean always played a fore-
most role in Brazilian development and it has become even more important in recent 
years after the discoveries of many resources, including enormous off-shore oil and gas, 
in pre-salt deposits (Koning 2015). 
Having settled the frontiers, Rio Branco looked more to Washington than London, 
which was also more in tune with the young republic. It is during his ministry that the 
‘unwritten alliance’ with the United States (US) was established. In 1905, in Rio de 
Janeiro, the US opened its only embassy in South America and the American Secretary 
of State visited Brazil in 1906. Brazil was often the American go-between in South 
America (Burns 1993: 280-285). However, in the 1930’s, under Vargas, this started to 
change slowly when the Brazilian government starts its programme of national devel-
opment, known as desenvolvimentismo. For the first time, although in a limited way, 
foreign policy becomes a part of the government’s strategy to further the country’s in-
dustrialisation. Furthermore, in that decade, Germany and the US were competing to 
increase their influence in Brazil, which gave Vargas more room for negotiation. That 
changed under Dutra’s government (1946-1951), which followed Washington again 
as did Kubitschek (1956-1961) in his first years. This president, who really pushed 
Brazil’s national development forward, especially its industrialisation, tried a more au-
tonomous path, from 1958 onwards, following in Vargas’s footsteps (Visentini 1994: 
24-28). His successor, Jânio Quadros, although only in power for seven months, left 
an important legacy in the area of foreign policy, as he established the PEI. According 
to Henrique Altemani de Oliveira, the PEI really starts in 1961 and was kept until 
1964, under Goulart, although in those years, it is more “an intention, a discourse”, 
which will be implemented in the Geisel government (2008: 91-92). However this 
discourse was extremely important as it changed Brazil’s foreign policy, and became 
more geared to “support its objective of national development, also a goal of other 
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30 nations, with which we wish to develop closer relationships”. It was highly significant 
because Brazil looked at its own interests, not those of others (2008: 91-92). For Bra-
zil, this was innovative. 
This entailed looking for new markets, particularly in the South, in the rest of 
Latin America, and in other continents, Africa, Asia and Oceania. There was a special 
emphasis on Africa, not only to find new markets but also to give support to countries 
that were fighting for their independence. In 1961, Afonso Arinos was the first Foreign 
Minister to visit an African country. One of the main points made in the Goulart Gov-
ernment, and presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 and 1962, 
by Afonso Arinos, addressed the link between development and international trade, 
explaining how the world market situation did work against the interests of develop-
ing countries. Measures taken by blocs such as the European Economic Community 
hindered exports of products from developing countries. This led to the First United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Its objective 
was to formulate systems achieving reasonable prices for raw materials and agricultural 
products from developing countries, as well as fostering their process of industrialisa-
tion (Oliveira 2008: 92-96).
In 1962, Brazil was also one of the countries that argued in favour of non-inter-
vention and against the expulsion of Cuba from the Organisation of American States. 
Together with Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, it abstained (Gon-
çalves, Miyamoto, 1993: 211-246). On the other hand, Mônica Hirst considers that 
the period of automatic alignment started in 1942, when Brazil joined the Allies in 
the fight against the Axis countries, until 1977, when Geisel started its autonomous 
policy (2006: 91-97). 
In fact, it could be said that within Brazil itself there are two main tendencies: the 
nationalists versus the so-called entreguistas. This division in these two groups started 
in the 50s, when the entreguistas automatically aligned themselves to the American 
position, without asking for any compensation, or without considering if this align-
ment was positive for Brazil, while the nationalists wanted to foster national develop-
ment and take the necessary measures to that end (Manzur 1999: 49-53). Amado Luiz 
Cervo coined these two groups as independentistas, or nationalists and associacionistas 
or those in favour of alignment, the two tendencies that marked the Brazil of the 30s 
to the 90s. According to Cervo, the “parameters of the thinking of the independen-
tistas prevailed, although tempered in practice by the influence of associacionistas”. 
Vargas, Kubitschek and Quadros belong to the nationalist tendency (Cervo 2008: 
15-20). Guimarães starts his analysis from independence, outlining a list of patriots: 
the Baron of Mauá, Alves Branco, Roberto Simonsen, Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino Ku-
bitschek, Celso Furtado and Ernesto Geisel who “understood the need to promote the 
industrialisation of the country, to build, expand and integrate its domestic market, 
to develop their technological capacity, to diversify its relations with the outside world 
and to reduce its vulnerability and dependence on so-called great powers, former co-
lonial metropolises, or neo-colonial metropolis” (2006: 345). These two tendencies 
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31are also reflected during the military regime, in the middle of the Cold War. Different 
military governments are more or (much) less aligned with the US and these tenden-
cies continue after the return to democracy. 
BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME
After the military coup of 1964, Brazil, once more aligned itself with Washington. The 
US Embassy in Brazil, the State Department and the Pentagon had not only supported 
but even given the incentive for the military coup (Toledo 2004: 22). As quid pro quo, 
the Brazilian government hoped for substantial American support, in particular help 
to develop the national economy and reduce the enormous shortages in defence mate-
rial. This Brazilian position was not new, but the original aspect was to show the US 
the great utility in strengthening Brazil’s potential, as both countries shared the same 
values. These ideas were developed by Golbery do Couto e Silva, linked to the Brazil-
ian National War College. Golbery had written Geopolítica do Brasil, published in the 
50s, which recommended the transformation of Brazil in major world power (apud 
Gonçalves, Miyamoto 1993: 213-214). 
Practically, at the start of the military regime, the Castelo Branco government 
(1964-1967) broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba because that country was sus-
pected of covering up “propaganda activities of its agents” in Brazil (Garcia 2005: 
191). The diplomats closest to PEI, were turned away by the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, or resigned. A number of diplomats were also dismissed (Visentini 1998: 26-28). 
However, when Juracy Magalhães became Minister of Foreign Affairs, while, on the 
one hand, he stated that what was good for the US was good for Brazil, that Brazil 
should respect its history and culture, and was part of the Western world, and ‘be loyal 
to the western world’, id est the US, on the other hand, the country should also fol-
low its independent foreign policy. He stressed in particular that Brazil was looking 
towards Eastern Europe to expand its trade, as long as it was mutually beneficial. He 
also wanted to develop “full cooperation with Africa and Asia”, as well as a “neces-
sary economic integration with Latin America, our natural habitat” (Magalhães, apud 
Visentini 1998: 28-29). Meanwhile, in 1965, the Minister of Planning, Roberto Cam-
pos, considered so pro-American that he was called Bob Fields by nationalists, had 
visited the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (USSR), followed, two months later, 
by the first Joint Commission Brazil-USSR. Diplomatic relations had been restored in 
1961 after having been broken off in 1947. The Kubitschek Government had resumed 
trade relations with the Soviet Union because the USSR had begun to set up aid pro-
grammes for developing countries: providing loans at low interest rates, the possibility 
of barter and, of crucial importance, providing technology transfer, a difficult area of 
cooperation with the US and other industrialised countries. Besides Brazil, Argen-
tina, Mexico and Uruguay had also re-established trade relations with the USSR (Silva 
2004: 106-108; Visentini 1998: 25; Visentini 1995: 157-158).
Ib
er
oa
m
er
ic
an
a,
 X
V
I, 
62
 (2
01
6)
, 2
7-
42
M
A
R
IA
N
N
E
 L
. 
W
IE
S
E
B
R
O
N
32 In the meantime, the US was not willing to give the expected support. On the 
other hand, the United States had hoped that Brazil would send troops to Vietnam, 
which the Brazilian government was not willing to do, only expressing its solidarity. 
The Castelo Branco government was disappointed by Washington’s position, although 
it mentioned that relations between both countries “were excellent, but even so there 
were areas of disagreement” (Silva 2004: 75-77). Therefore, the search for alternatives 
went on bilaterally and multilaterally. A great number of bilateral negotiations took 
place, on the continent itself, in western and socialist Europe and in Africa. This was 
also the case for multilateral negotiations, which were mostly concentrated in different 
UN institutions, such as UNCTAD, where Brazil tried to lead the demands of devel-
oping countries, but also at the Sixth Round of Negotiations of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Multilateral diplomacy was especially strong during the 
Costa e Silva government (1967-1969). This government also considered the nuclear 
topic of fundamental importance. Although in favour of nuclear disarmament in Latin 
America and non-proliferation, Brazil refused to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty, as 
proposed by the US and the USSR. The government wanted to develop nuclear energy 
for its economic and technological development. This government’s motto for foreign 
policy, “Prosperity Diplomacy”, was quite different from the previous one and could 
be considered a form of PEI, although it would never state this as such (Pereira 2010: 
30-32, 38-41, 49-50; Santana 2006: 158).
Under the Medici Government (1969-1974), Brazil’s foreign policy was based on 
‘Diplomacy of National Interest’, where besides multilateral actions, the focus would 
be on bilateral relations to stimulate national development. One of the areas of inter-
est was the Middle East, of crucial importance as a provider of oil. Brazil was the sev-
enth oil importer in the world. At the same time, a big effort was made to reduce the 
negative trade balance with that region (Santana 2006: 158-161). But, it should also 
be remembered that these were the years of the “economic miracle” with an average 
annual growth of over 11% per year, reaching 14% in 1973. In that year, the growth 
in Latin America was 8.4% and globally 6.1%. The next government, that of Ernesto 
Geisel (1974-1979) could not replicate these results. This was largely due to the oil 
crisis, although the goals stated in the 1974 National Development Plan II, was of 
an average annual growth of 10%, and 12% for industry. In fact, during the Geisel 
government, the average annual growth decreased to 6.7%, although industry got an 
enormous impulse. (Macarini 2011: 32-36, 43-44). This Plan constituted the second 
wave of import substitution industrialisation. The number of state owned enterprises 
increased substantially. Two areas were considered very relevant in the search of more 
autonomy: petrochemicals and informatics, with the establishment of a “domestic in-
dustry for electronic components and inputs, technological autonomy (vis à vis other 
countries) and also a national equipment industry” (Knight 2014: 20). Diversification 
in the area of energy was another priority. One of the main objectives was the reduc-
tion of Brazil’s dependence on oil, after the oil crisis of 1973. Therefore, huge invest-
ments were made in developing hydroelectricity, nuclear energy and fuel for cars made 
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33from alcohol that came from sugar cane, a renewable energy. Germany, for instance, 
played a crucial role in the development of Brazil’s nuclear energy. As the Americans 
were exerting pressure against the nuclear cooperation with Germany, President Geisel 
ended the Brazilian American Military Agreement, established in 1952 (Pereira 2010: 
87-89, 110; Visentini 2003: 52-53).
In this period, Brazil’s foreign policy became truly diversified and global, imple-
menting numerous bilateral relations, because, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aza-
redo da Silveira, underlined during a speech in 1974 at the Escola Superior do Exé-
rcíto, there could be “no automatic alignments as diplomatic actions should be based 
on situations not countries. Diplomacy should be pragmatic” (apud Santana 2006: 
165) It would be the period of Geisel’s “Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism“. 
This Government really followed an independent foreign policy and put Brazil on the 
world map (Santana 2006: 163-166; Visentini 2003, 49-51).
With its concern over access to oil, one of its priorities was to intensify relations 
with Arab countries. Bilateral agreements were signed with Kuwait, Iran, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia. Between 1974-1979, Iraq became an important partner, and Brazil 
exported a broad range of products, industrial, agricultural, resources and infra-
structure to that country (Santana 2006: 169-170). Brazil was also very present in 
Africa. Brazil was the first to recognise the newly independent country Marxist An-
gola. It had good relations with Mozambique and other African countries. Brazilian 
positions were actively defended on the multilateral stage and in particular towards 
Africa, Brazil was a great protagonist. Besides Germany, the government intensified 
relations with other European countries and Japan, strategic partners, in trade, in-
vestments and technology transfer. To that end, relations were also established with 
a number of socialist countries (Visentini 2003: 52). In 1974, diplomatic relations 
were re-established with the People’s Republic of China. Chino-Brazilian relations 
included technological cooperation, for example the joint development of satellites 
besides trade. Furthermore, Brazil and China had similar stances on a couple of 
issues, such as ensuring national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and total op-
position to any interference concerning human rights (Oliveira 2004: 12-14). In 
the second half of the seventies, within Latin America, Brazil started the Amazon 
Cooperation Treaty (ACT) as a way to protect the sovereignty of the eight countries 
forming part of the Amazon region, and to set up some joint strategies to develop 
that region (Visentini 2003: 53). It was a way to strengthen Brazil’s cooperation with 
its neighbours, not an easy endeavour as many neighbours had border issues with 
their other neighbours, but Silveira pulled it off. It was also a way to strengthen its 
position vis-à-vis Argentina (Spektor 2002: 132). 
The policy of Geisel’s “responsible and ecumenical pragmatism” was followed by 
Figueiredo’s “universalism” (1979-1985). The last president of the military regime had 
to govern in a difficult period, nationally and internationally. Brazil suffered from the 
second oil crisis and even more from the financial policies introduced by the American 
government. It began with the end of the gold standard in 1971, the devaluation of 
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34 the dollar in 1973 and foremost with the sudden great increase of the interest rate in 
1979, which was kept quite high well into 1981. These financial policies, especially the 
increase in interest rates penalised the countries in the south as the prices of commodi-
ties fell dramatically, leading to the debt crisis (Serrano 2002: 249-250). The 1982 
Malvinas/Falkands War only increased the problems in South America. Although 
Figueiredo’s administration wanted to continue Geisel’s foreign policies, the economic 
problems and the international developments, such as a weaker USSR, while Japan 
and Europe became more aligned towards the US, made that quite difficult. Rela-
tions with Africa and the Middle East, on the other hand, were easier to maintain. 
Figueiredo was the first Brazilian president to visit African countries. One of the issues 
that the Brazilian government wanted to prevent was the militarization of the South 
Atlantic. South Africa, under the apartheid regime, together with Argentina and the 
US were working on such a project, therefore it was important to intensify bilateral 
relations with other African countries (Visentini 2003: 62-66; Pereira, 2010: 129-130; 
Barbosa 2015: 87-89, 91). The more pro-Arab stance, a change from the previous 
policy of equidistance, which was started under Geisel’s government, was reinforced 
during Figueiredo’s, with the opening in Brasilia of an Office of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (Santana 2006: 158, 167-168, 175).
THE RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC REGIMES, FROM 1985 ONWARDS
Within the region, relations with Argentina, which had been quite tense under Gei-
sel, improved under Figueiredo’s administration, as the partnership with Argentina 
became a cornerstone in Brazil’s foreign policy. Brazil supported Argentina’s claim 
to the Malvinas, in the 1982 war, which Argentina lost. It was the start of a number 
of bilateral agreements between both countries (Spektor 2002: 126-132). The bilat-
eral partnership increased during the first civilian government, that of José Sarney 
(1985-1990), although not yet directly elected, and was reflected in the 1986 Ar-
gentine-Brazilian Integration Act, which contained a number of bilateral protocols. 
The 1988 Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development was the first step to 
bilateral integration, which would have included setting up “certain integrated pro-
duction units for the purpose of promoting sensitive technologies in sectors consid-
ered strategic for the economic development” (Spektor 2002: 136). During Sarney’s 
government, this partnership was enhanced as foreign policy became even more 
difficult because of the new global order, the high US interest rates, the increasing 
debts of Latin American countries, Brazil amongst them, which resulted in the Lost 
Decade for that region. The Brazilian government had less room for manoeuvre and 
concentrated itself on its own hemisphere. Besides the structural rapprochement 
with Argentina, the administration started partnerships with other Latin Ameri-
can countries, including Mexico and other middle powers from the South, such as 
South Africa and India. However, despite the problems of that decade, the Brazilian 
Iberoam
ericana, X
V
I, 62 (2016),27-42
P
O
L
ÍT
IC
A
 E
X
T
E
R
N
A
 IN
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
E
, F
R
O
M
 G
E
IS
E
L
 T
O
 L
U
L
A
35government continued to seek diversification in partnerships to avoid “over-depend-
ence, whether political or economic, on one of the centres of international power” 
(Sennes 2003: 121-124). 
During Sarney’s government, another initiative that had started under the mili-
tary regime was set up. This concerned the attention for the South Atlantic, a zone 
of interest for Brazil, and African countries on the other side of the Ocean, foremost 
Nigeria and Angola. In 1986, 12 African countries with an Atlantic coast and 3 South 
American ones, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay became partners and formed the Zone 
for Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), which was approved by a 
UN resolution 41/11 in 1986, with one vote of the US against and eight abstentions, 
mostly by European, such as the UK, France, and also by Japan. The objectives were 
twofold, foremost to keep powers of the north out of the South Atlantic, in particular 
the US. Furthermore, the South Atlantic should become a nuclear free zone, and the 
countries should cooperate to foster their own development (Barbosa 2015: 86-97). It 
was an important statement. Since then the number of African member states has in-
creased to 21 and the cooperation has since been adapted to the post cold-war period, 
maintaining questions of defence and cooperation (Barbosa 2015: 98-130). 
However, it is during the nineties that a number of fundamental changes occur. 
With the return to democracy, a new phase, national and international, begins for 
Brazil. The national development policies are abandoned and the country enters the 
neoliberal era. The Collor de Mello government (1990-1992) opens the market and 
lowers tariffs without asking for any compensation. The establishment of the Com-
mon Market of the South (Mercosur), in 1991, should also be seen in this perspective, 
as Paraguay and Uruguay had lower tariffs than Brazil and Argentina and they did not 
have a development project (Visentini 2003: 80-84; Sennes 2003: 119).
After Collor’s impeachment, Itamar Franco (1992-1995), tries to apply some 
brakes to this process. However it is under the government of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1995-2002) that the neoliberal agenda is really implemented, and to that 
end, even the 1988 constitution is changed to allow for re-election of the president. 
The Real Plan is introduced, with a strong currency tied to the dollar, not as rigidly 
as in Argentina, but it still makes exports more expensive, and as a consequence, for 
the first time, the trade balance is negative. Furthermore the government introduces 
an austere monetary policy; sky-high interest rates, which has a negative effect on 
economic growth. And last but not least, according to the recipe of the International 
Monetary Fund, large state owned enterprises, which were doing quite well, are pri-
vatized, leading to serious employment problems, among others (Visentini 2003: 92-
94). Opening the economy is considered an international insertion strategy, but, in 
general, Latin American society was very unhappy with its results. It was followed by 
social upheaval and the electoral loss of all neoliberal governments, as social exclusion 
has reached around 40% of Latin American population by 2003, according to data 
from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean, known as ECLAC (Cervo 2008: 22). But this was the way to go —what Marga-
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36 ret Thatcher coined TINA: there is no alternative— or the consequence of “prevailing 
circumstances”, the expression used by Cardoso and Lafer – “the global interdepend-
ence that embarrassed the neoliberal mind would not allow an alternative to decision-
making in foreign policy. ... Neoliberalism claimed, moreover, a revolution in science, 
in politics and thought” (Cervo 2008: 22-23). 
However, there was criticism against asymmetrical globalisation, and scepticism 
about Cardoso’s neoliberalism, among others, in “ways of inconsistency or post con-
sistency?” according to Cervo (2008: 23-24). Thus, in the last years of Cardoso’s gov-
ernment, more policies are developed to defend the country’s national interests and 
it negotiates more and is not making concessions without compensation. One of the 
important initiatives set up by Brazil is the first meeting of South American presidents 
in Brasilia in 2000. One of the major results of this conference was the Initiative for 
the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), a very ambi-
tious project of regional integration through the development of networks of roads, 
water ways, railways, harbours, telecommunications, pipelines, etc. The different pro-
jects which have been set up in South America were also a reaction to US initiatives, 
first President Bush’s 1990 Initiative for the Americas, a start to boost hemispheric 
trade cooperation, and then the 1994 proposal for the establishment of a Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas for the whole hemisphere, after the North American Free 
Trade Agreement had come into force on January 1994. Brazil was at the forefront es-
tablishing different forms of cooperation, such as Mercosur and IIRSA (Becard 2009: 
96-103; Visentini/Wiesebron 2004).
At the same time, in the nineties, the Brazilian government modifies the positions 
it had before, instead of stating it is part of the Third World it tries to become part 
of the First World, as according to Fernando Henrique Cardoso “O Brasil não é sub-
desenvolvido, mas sim um país injusto” (Lahoz 1999). In this decade there is again a 
greater convergence between Brazil and the US, a stage which Hirst calls adjustment, 
an affinity with Western political values, especially after 9-11-2001, but also great 
differences. Topics which Brazilian governments did not consider “subject to negotia-
tion” became acceptable in the nineties, such as discussions on the strengthening of 
democratic values, human rights, the fight against drug trafficking, and the environ-
ment. This change in attitude is well illustrated by the fact that the 1992 Conference 
on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro. However, the country 
maintains a non-interventionist position, unlike the US. The country did not give its 
support either to the attack of Afghanistan, under American leadership, or to the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003 (Hirst 2006: 97-103, 111-114). 
Meanwhile, there was another crucial topic where Cardoso took a different posi-
tion to his predecessors, as in 1998 he signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
The military presidents and Sarney had not considered this topic negotiable, in spite 
of American pressure, as they had objected to the intrinsic imbalance between the 
Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), and the 
fact that there is no way that NNWS can have an impact on NWS to keep their side 
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37of the bargain and get rid of weapons with nuclear warheads (Oliveira 2008: 67-72; 
Sennes 2003: 120). Cardoso also did not deem it useful to invest in defence, as there 
is “a real ring of peace around the country” as was stated in the 1996 Política de Defesa 
Nacional.1 While the military governments had invested quite substantially in the de-
velopment of a national defence industry, during the Cardoso government a lot of the 
military equipment became obsolete. Under Lula, especially in his second mandate, 
the issue of the importance of defence, investment in defence equipment, was again 
put on the agenda. His 2005 Política de Defesa Nacional (PND) was followed in 2008 
by the Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, approved as decree 6.703 on December 18.2 
Almeida made an interesting table showing the difference in defence policies under 
the Cardoso and Lula governments, and highlighting in how far Lula’s policies were 
innovative (2010: 244-245). In particular, the PND was very innovative as it made 
Brazil’s new objectives in the area of defence quite clear, the tasks of the three military 
forces, their cooperation, the need to invest in national defence industry. Brazil must 
be able to protect itself and its sovereignty and, moreover, as an emerging power, it 
also needs to invest in its hard power, although it strongly favours soft power (Nye 
1990: 153-171; Wilson 2008: 110-122). To that end, Brazil has signed a number of 
military strategic partnerships, which always include the transference of technology. 
The strategic partnership considered the most relevant is the one signed with France, 
also in 2008, for the construction of conventional and nuclear submarines and a 
specific harbour for submarines in Brazil. Conforming to the 1988 Constitution and 
the NPT, the nuclear submarine will not have nuclear warheads. Even so the acquisi-
tion of the nuclear submarine is a Brazilian ambition (Melo 2015: 164-170). After 
Lula, President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2018), has also taken measures to strengthen 
Brazil’s national defence industry, with special incentives for the acquisition of de-
fence equipment.3 It is part of the development of nuclear technology, as the PND 
also made it crystal clear that the development of national nuclear, cyber and space 
technologies is of paramount importance for the country’s independence. In the same 
year 2008, Brazil signed an agreement with Argentina to start a partnership for the 
joint development of a nuclear reactor. The country, which has huge deposits of ura-
nium, is also developing enriched uranium (Oliveira 2008: 64-66, 75-77). Further-
more, again in the year 2008, another Brazilian initiative led to the establishment 
1 Política de Defesa Nacional, Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Coleção Documentos da Pre-
sidência da República. Brasília: Presidência da República. 1996. In: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/
publi_04/colecao/DEFES.htm> (15.02.2011).
2 See: Presidência da República Federativa do Brasil, Política de Defesa Nacional, Decreto Nº 5.484, 
de 30 de junho. In: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Decreto/D5484.
htm> (15.02.2011); Presidência da República Federativa do Brasil, Estratégia Nacional de Defe-
sa, Decreto Nº 6.703, de 18 de dezembro. In: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-
2010/2008/Decreto/D6703.htm> (28.10.2011).
3 Presidência da República Federativa do Brasil, regras de incentivo à área estratégica de defesa, Lei 
Nº 12.598, de 21 de março. In: <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/
L12598.htm> (28.10.2015).
Ib
er
oa
m
er
ic
an
a,
 X
V
I, 
62
 (2
01
6)
, 2
7-
42
M
A
R
IA
N
N
E
 L
. 
W
IE
S
E
B
R
O
N
38 of the South-American Defence Council within the framework of Union of South 
American Nations, known as Unasur. It was a way to create a stable region, as there 
were tensions in the Andes, to work on a joint security project, create possibilities for 
the joint acquisition of military equipment, and to create an institution that is follow-
ing its own objectives, not those of the US (Varas 2008: 4-7). 
It is not only in this area that Lula makes his mark. During his government, from 
2003 onwards, the tide began to change nationally, with a major project of social 
inclusion, which began as Fome Zero, but became an integrated and complex pro-
gramme, known as Bolsa Familia. Together with a number of other programmes, pov-
erty in Brazil was reduced drastically and consumption increased substantially. Lula 
put the fight against poverty also on the international agenda, in the World Economic 
Forum in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Moreover, the government 
conceived a series of programmes to generate (the first) job(s), allowing the purchase 
of housing at reasonable terms, getting electricity to isolated places, and since 2007, 
the Acceleration Growth Programme to stimulate the economy (Wiesebron 2014: 
126-149). These social policies have an influence on foreign policy and allow a posi-
tive perspective on globalization with “the notions of sovereignty, national interest, 
and integration based on ‘developmentalism’ taken seriously,” according to Visentini 
(2003:103-105). This enables the country to fully develop all actions taken bilaterally 
and multilaterally, and allows for the full international insertion of Brazil. Within the 
region, regional cooperation evolves a project for the whole of South America, Unasur, 
which started in 2004, given more form in 2008, again an original process of regional 
integration as it encompasses all countries of South America, including Surinam and 
Guyana and goes well beyond economic cooperation. It is also an area of cooperation 
strongly supported by Dilma (Visentini 2014: 62-75). 
Besides initiatives in the region, Lula has been extremely active, while not forget-
ting the north, foremost developing south-south activities, many of them in Africa, 
but also in Asia. President Lula has stated that solidarity with Africa was a question 
of ethics but also economic common sense. Health diplomacy, assistance in the fight 
against HIV/AIDS, is one of the many activities Brazil developed on that continent 
(Schleicher 2015: 94-99). The most important African partner for Brazil is South 
Africa and in 2003, in Brasilia, the Forum of the India-Brazil-Africa was launched, 
bringing together “three of the most vibrant and globally active democracies of the 
developing world to engage in issues of international importance and mutual benefit 
.... giving priority to the south ... the size and relevance of IBSA in the global political 
economy offer a unique opportunity for a southern coalition to move to the centre of 
the emerging new world order” (IBSA 2003). In recent years, IBSA has been somehow 
overshadowed by the development of the BRIC, Brazil, Russia, India and China, a 
concept launched in 2001, by Jim O’Neil, as the emerging powers had a “healthier 
outlook: bigger growth than G7 on shorter and longer term” (2001). This concept be-
came a reality when the BRIC started summit meetings in 2009. From 2011 onwards, 
the group became BRICS, when South Africa was included. The most important re-
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39sult of the cooperation is the establishment of a BRICS development bank, which was 
launched in 2014, in Fortaleza, with Dilma as host. This new financial institution has 
an enormous impact because it is the first time that anything new is set up outside the 
Bretton Woods system (Stuenkel 2015). This is most definitely a form of PEI. 
CONCLUSION
The Política Externa Independente, established in 1961, really started to flourish under 
the military regime. At the start of the military regime in 1964, after a beginning of 
total alignment to the US, even under Castelo Branco, there was some attempt at 
reduced alignment, as Washington was not prepared to help Brazil in its objective of 
national development. Geisel was the most successful in promoting a truly independ-
ent foreign policy. Figueiredo, who wanted to maintain the independent course, could 
not do so, due to financial, economic and political adverse circumstances. 
Back to direct democracy in 1989, during the nineties, once more, Brazilian gov-
ernments became more aligned to Washington. This started to change at the end of 
Cardoso’s second mandate, when it became clear that Brazil was not gaining anything 
by adhering to policies of the First World. The changes became significant under Lula, 
who was very adept at keeping good relations with the north, the Americans and the 
Europeans —Brazil becomes a strategic partner of the European Union in 2007— but 
positions Brazil as a country of the south and multiplies initiatives, mostly south-
south, within the region, but also on other continents. Lula develops numerous and 
very diversified activities with African countries, but also with Asian countries, and 
across continents, such as the forum with India and South Africa. More recent is the 
BRIC cooperation, which developed from a concept into much more. In 2011, BRIC 
became BRICS, and, in 2014, a BRICS development bank was set up. This is a way 
to change the world order, and foster independent foreign policies. This is why Brazil 
should not be considered a middle power any more, but an emerged power (Burges 
2013: 286-288, 292-209), or as Daudelin has called it: “Joining the Club: Lula and 
the End of Periphery for Brazil” (2008: 51-78) 
It seems quite clear that Brazil’s national development thrives most under govern-
ments following nationalist policies, a Política Externa Independente, than under gov-
ernments which prefer to align themselves to Washington. The US proved time and 
time again, that it was not interested in giving any support to Brazil, technological or 
otherwise, as quid pro quo. This was true under the military regime, during the Cold 
War, but also afterwards, after the end of the Cold War and the return to democracy. 
Therefore, under the military regime, Brazilian governments decided to go their own 
way with their partners, even communist ones if need be, which proved useful for the 
country’s national development. This happened on a broad scale over the world, from 
Germany for nuclear energy to the Soviet Union for technology transfer and the Peo-
ples’ Republic of China for the cooperation on the construction of satellites, while Af-
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40 rica and the Middle East were and are important in other areas. Of course, the country 
had to take the international context into account, when it was developing its policies. 
But even so, Brazil became a global player. Geisel and Lula played a foremost role in 
this respect, especially the latter, because the democratic context was a big advantage. 
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